The United States Social Security system has accumulated unfunded liabilides esdmated at $9 trillion (John Geanakoplos et al., 1998). The need to meet these liabilides implies, other things being equal, a need for higher taxes in the future. The need for transidonal policies to fund the accumulated liability has generated increased interest in proposals for policy change which may yield improvements in efficiency and, in pardcular, improvements in the retum to Social Security investments. A number of proposals addressing the unfunded liabilides involve dropping the requirement that the assets of die Social Security fund should be invested solely in bonds and allowing some of the assets of the fund to be invested in equity. Cridcs such as Alan Greenspan (1999) have observed potendal confiicts of interest associated with public ownership of equity.
Very similar issues arise in assessing the proposal to reallocate Social Security investments fiom bonds to equity. Suppose that asset prices are determined in perfectly efficient markets and that taxpayers treat risk about net tax liabilities in the same way as they treat risk about income fiom direct ownership of capital.^ They will therefore regard themselves as owning a share in any publicly owned assets. A reallocation of the public portfolio which does not affect the distribution c^ income will lead to an offsetting reallocation of privately held assets which, under appropriate conditions, will leave equilibrium asset prices unchanged.^ If, on the other hand, the equity-premium and risk-finee rate puzzles arise from capital-market imperfections then it is possible that public sales of bonds and purchases of equity may have the effect of raising the retum to bonds and reducing retums to equity, and that these changes may increase welfare.
As noted above, the welfare benefits of diversification of Social Security investments depend ultimately on the ciqiacity of government to spread risk through the tax system. It is therefore important to consider whether a proposal for diversification may he interpreted simply as a welfare-increasing tax reform combined with an unrelated proposal for govemment purchases of equity.
The object of this papa is to examine these issues in a simple two-period model, which permits the derivation of an analytical solution to the problem of determining equilibrium asset prices in the presence of undiversifiable risk associated with adverse selection problems. The approach is, therefore, similar to that of Mankiw (1986) and Philippe WeU (1992). Our innovation is to introduce a government with the power to levy a proportional labor income tax and an obligation to make a specific defined payment in the second period. We also allow govemment investment in equity and comparê This equivalence is similar to the equ sbetv individual and corporate debt required for tiw ModiglianiMiller "homemade leverage" proposition tn hold. When viewed in an intertemporal context, tiw rationality requirement is similar to that needed for Ricardian equivalence.
This neutialiqr property may not hold in an economy witii endogeneous growtii. Andrew B. Abel (1999) shows in tiiis case tiiat tiw reallocation of Sodal Security funds to equity will reduce the equity premium and may increase tiw growtii rate of capital along a constant growtii patii.
the effects of such investments with and without complete risk pooling in private cqntal markets. Assuming that agents exhibit decreasirig absolute risk aversion, we show that, in the absence of private risk pooling, public ownership of equity will improve welfare. Decreasirig absolute risk aversion means that, in utility terms, the loss fiom a given increase in risk is greater at lower levels of income (see Josef Hadar and William R. Russell, 1969). Hence, ex ante welfare is increased by a policy that increases risk when income is high and reduces risk when income is low.
The proposal for purchase of equity is then compared with a tax reform proposal not involving purchase of equity, baseid on that of Robert B. Barsky et al. (1986) . In their proposal, second-period taxes are used to repay debt generated by a first-period budget deficit. It is shown that, particularly when the elasticity of labor supply is taken into account, the diversification proposal is ex ante. Pareto superior to that of Barsky et al.
L Generatfcms
The formal analysis presented in this paper employs a simple two-period model, since such a model enables us to analyze the critical issues without distracting complications. However, the two-period model considered here may usefully be regarded as a subset of an overhq>ping-generadons model, with three generations: young, middle-aged, and old. Unlike most overlappinggenerations models, where attention is focused on dynamically stable equilibria with fixed institutions, we consider a transition from one set of institutions to another. As Geanakoplos et al. (1998) emphasize, it is the unavoidable transitional cost that is cmcial in understanding the problems of the Social Security fund.
We assume that for some time prior to the present, retirement income has been provided through a social security scheme, under which the young and middle-aged pay taxes to finance defined benefits received in old age. The scheme is not self-funding, that is, the present value of net benefits received by any given cohort is positive. However, until the present period, denoted as period 1, income growth has been such that the scheme is sustainable with a fixed level of taxation. Looking ahead to period 2, it is evident that taxes will have to be raised to meet the obligation to those who will be old in that period. The scheme will be scr^iped (or privatized) so that no benefits will be payable after period 2, so we focus our attention on the question of financing this once-off liability payable in period 2.
As period 1 retirees (passively) consume the Social Security payments that are paid out in period 1, their consumption will not be explicitly modeled. Furthermore, we shall assume that the middle-aged workers in period 1, who will be retirees in period 2 and who will be the beneficiaries of the Social Security payments paid out in period 2, consume all their disposable income in period 1. Hence they can also be "netted out" from the formal analysis as their consumption in both periods is also predetermined. Finally, we assume that any contribution made by the generation who are young in period 2 can be netted out.
These simplifications allow us to focus our attention on those who are young in period 1 and will be middle-aged in period 2. They must decide how to meet the once-off obligation to pay benefits in period 2. The crucial issue is whether the govemment can improve the welfare of the young today by acquiring equity in period 1 to assist in financing its obligation to meet Social Security payments to the old in period 2. Once the retum to this investment is realized in period 2, the necessary labor income tax rate is determined by the difference between investment income and the benefit liability. In period 2, the wage for each i is a random variable Wi.* Moreover, the supply of labor for some individuals may be constrained because of unemployment. Hence, the individual's (netax wage income is given by Two polar cases are considered. In the labormarket clearing case, there are no unemployment constraints. Random variation in K, -arises solely from variation in Wi and the resulting endogenous labor-supply response. In the Keynesian involuntary unemployment case, the wage is nonstochastic and variation in secondperiod income arises solely from tiie unemployment constraint.
U. The Modei
In addition to their endowment of labor hours, all young workers are endowed at birth with the same number (normalized to 1) of shares of a two-period lived tradable asset that we shall refer to as "equity." The dividend, payable in the second period, D, is random. Workers may also buy and sell a risk-fiee bond which pays unconditionally one unit of the * Throughout, capital letters will denote random variables (that is, real functions defined on the underiyjng state space) and lowercase letters will denote realizations and nonrandom variables. Since diere is no uncertainty in period I. we suppress die time subscript for random variables. consumpdon good in period 2. All workers are endowed with zero units of the risk-fiee bond. Adverse selecdon problems, modeled in more detdl in Grant and Quiggin (1999), prevent workers ftom insuring themselves agdnst risk in their second-period labor income. Thus, workers are faced with nondiversifiable idiosyncradc risk.T he govemment is committed to providing in each of the two periods an amount s, of Socid Security payments to the retirees in that period. We assume there is only one tax instrument, a proportiond labor income tax, and that the govemment sets first-period taxes at a level just sufficient to meet the Socid Security obligadon in that period,^ so with an appropriate normdizadon.
where T, is the labor income tax rate in period /. In the first period the govemment can dso issue bonds and purchase equity. In the second period it supplements the (net) revenue derived from its first-period portfolio holding with a propordond labor income tax on second-period workers to meet any shortfdl in covering its commitment to pay retirees S2. This tax is levied at a rate T, which is, in generd, a random variable. The transidond problem of financing the accumulated deficit is refiected in the assumption that r > T, with probability 1.
Let p Along widi her state-condngent second-period labor income, y,, and dw state-condngent labor income tax rate, T, diat sadsfies (4), her portfolio choice (jCj, bf) in the first period leads to a second-period random wedth of (6) Since (young) workers are risk-averse and identical ex ante (dthough not ex post) they will not trade with each other in equilibrium. Hence the characterizadon of the (rational expectations) equilibrium simply involves finding asset prices that support the consumers' initial endowment less the govemment's portfolio choice (g', g"). Hence the equilibrium holdings of equity and bonds for each worker i must be For analytical convenience we have taken die value of die government's net position to be zero, but diis is without any essential loss of generality. Qualitatively die results we derive would sdll hold if the government were "endowed" widi an outstanding stock of debt (which would have to be serviced in die second period) and it had a "surplus" from (8) die lahor hKome tax in period 1 which mete than covered Uw govemment's Sodal Security payments for this period. In this case die issue would he how much of the surplus should he used to reduce the outstanding stnck of debt (i.e., effecdvely "invesdngi" the tax surplus in honds) versus usitig die surplus to purchase equity. where b = f bj dj (per capita holding of bonds).
Combining (7) and (8) and where E is the mathematical expectations operator.
Letting R^ (respectively, R^,) denote the (gross) retum to holding equity (respectively, a bond) it readily follows from (9) and (10) that
and thus, the equilibrium equity premium in ratio form, denoted by ir, may be expressed as (11)
IT'
In Weil's (1992) analysis, D and y, are assumed to be statistically independent which means that risk aversion (that is, 112 < 0) is sufficient to ensure that CovlD, and, hence, 7r > I.
< 0

A. Diversification and the Distribution of Consumption
We now consider the impact of diversification on the distribution of consumption for given labor income Y^.^ To examine more closely the effect the govemment's holding of equity has on the period distribution of secondperiod consumption, notice that by substituting the market-clearing conditions for the bond and equity markets [i.e., (7) and (8) This neutrality breaks down, however, if workers face undiversifiable risk associated with their labor income. Results from the literature on the portfolio problem with one risky asset and one safe asset may be used to show that, as would be expected, an increase in govemment purchases of equity, financed by the sale of bonds, will increase die reladve price of equity to bonds and thus will reduce the equity premium ir.
Consider now the welfare effects. If we assume, as Weil (1992) does, that D and K, are stadsdcally independent then P is a degenerate random variable (i.e., it is constant across all states). To see what the effects of govemment holdings of equity might be under this assumption, consider (12) and (13) and observe that, for values of g' between 0 and 1 the existence of a govemment holding of equity induces addidonal variation in posttax labor income, which is undesirable, ceteris paribus. However, notice that if dividend income D is less than p/q, the payout firom the govemment's equity holding does not cover the amount it owes to its bondholders and so the govemment must set a labor income tax rate T greater than s/Y. From (14) we see this in tum means that the variadon of posttax labor income (and hence second-period consumpdon) across individuals is reduced in periods when dividend income is low. Conversely, in periods in which the dividend income is high (i.e., D > p/q) the variadon of posttax labor income is increased. The change in the distribudon of an individual's secondperiod consumpdon induced by the govemment's holding of equity cannot be simply ranked in terms of risk aversion. If. however, we assume that young workers display decreasing absolute risk aversion then we can establish (as is formally shown in Proposidon 1 below) that a small govemment holding of equity is ex ante welfare-enhancing for young workers. Decreasing absolute risk aversion means that, in udlity terms, the loss fiom a given increase in risk is greater at lower levels of income (See
Hadar and Russell, 1969). Hence, ex ante welfare is increased by a policy that increases risk when income is high and reduces risk when income is low.
Before proceeding further, it is useful to observe that (D-p/q),^^ _ For small values of g^ the second term will be dominated by the first. But for large values of g', if the reladve price p/q is increasing in g" then the second term will inqily that increases in g' provide a second-degree stochasdc improvement in the distribudon of second-period consumpdon for the young. As noted above, provided g° < 1, the decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that the equilibrium reladve price of the risky equity to risk-free bond is increasing (and hence the equilibrium equity premium is decreasing) as g' is increased. PROPOSITION 1: Assume D and Yt are statistically independent and tiuit second-period preferences display decreasing absolute risk aversion (thatis, i4(c) > 0,U2(c) <Q,and -uy,c)lv^c)is mtmotcmically decreasing). Then titeir ex ante weyare is an increasing functitm qfg", the govemment holdings qfeqtdty.
PROOF:
See Appendix.
The assumpdon that K, and D are independendy distributed may seem too strong and not accord very well with the empirical record. What may be viewed as the opposite polar assumpdon about the state-condngent distribudon of workers' second-period income appears in Mankiw (1986), in which a single measure of aggregate (or systemwide risk) is concentrated on a small propordon of the populadon. This can be incorporated, however, into Weil's framework with an individual facing both aggregate systemwide risk and a personal or idiosyncratic risk associated with his or her labor income, by the requirement that the distribudon of labor income across the populadon improves in the sense of second-order "stochastic" dominance for higher values of the second-period dividend. More formally, the relaxation of independence that we have in mind may be expressed as follows, for all pairs of states, o> and &>' , and any strictly increasing concave function,/: . However, in a neighborhood of g' = 0, the mean effect must dominate. Hence, for small values of g", the conclusion that diversification will increase welfare is strengthened by consideration of labor-supply effects. Now consider a labor-maiket-dearing economy where wage income and profits are positively correlated, as in a real-business-cycle version of Mankiw's model. Thus, even in the absence of govemment holdings of equity, the tax rate required to meet the Social Security obligation will vaiy inversely with the average wage. This variation will be increased by the taxes required to balance variations in dividend income from govemment holdings of equity. This effect generates a first-order welfare loss from labor-supply distortions even in a neighborhood of ^' = 0. Moreover, the labor-supply distortion will exacerbate the variability of consumption and will therefore offset the risk reduction associated with diversification. An approximate formula for the welfare loss associated with distorting taxation is (16) A « 0.5W, -Ŝ ince both the risk-reduction benefits and the labor-supply distortion costs of diversification are greater in the Mankiw case than in the Weil case, the relative benefits or costs of diversification cannot be ranked unambiguously in the absence of specific conditions on the model parameters.
Finally, consider an involuntaiy unemployment case, where the wage is nonstochastic and variation in second-period income arises solely from the unemployment constraint. For this case, it is natural to focus on a Mankiw-style model where unemployment constraints apply in the recession state and are bome by a sinall proportion of the population. Since those subject to a labor-supply constraint are not affected by the wage tax distortion, the welfare loss A in (16) is an expectation calculated only over the boom event and the event (recession, no job loss). However, it is the event (recession, job loss) which contributes most of the covariance between T and K,/?. Hence, tiie welfare loss associated with labor-supply distortions will be smdler in the Keynesian involuntary unemployment version of the Mankiw model than in the maiket-dearing red-business-cycle version.
In dl cases, the bdance between the riskreducing effects of diversificadon and the welfare costs of labor supply will depend on die partid risk-aversion parameter a = The closer is a to 1, the greater the riskreducdon benefit and the smdler the laborsupply response to variadons in posttax wages.
More importandy, the balance between riskreducdon and labor-suj^ly distortion will depend on the nature of fluctuadons in aggregate inconw. In an economy with Keynesian involuntaiy unemployment, where profits and labor income covaiy strongly and recessions are characterized by a failure of the labor market to clear, the benefits of risk reducdon will be relatively large and the costs of labor-suiqily distordon reladvely smdl. In an economy where labor markets dways clear, variadons in aggregate income refiect variadons in factor producdvity, and there is no necessaiy correladon between labor income and profits, the reverse will be true.
UL Tax Relbnn WUhont Diveniflcation
The requirement for budget balance in the model presented above implies that any change in the public holding of assets must be matched by a change in tax policy. It is important, therefore, to consider the possibility that the beneficid effects attributed to diversificadon of public holding of assets arise simply because of the risk-reducing effects of taxadon, and that similar benefits could be achieved by any policy which required second-period taxes to offset first-period policy decisions. As Dean Croushore (19%) observes, the results derived by BMZ depend on the assumption diat labor supply is perfectly inelasdc. Widi elasdc labor supply, die opdmd first-period deficit and the welfare benefits of the policy are substantidly reduced. In this secdon, we compare the BMZ proposd with the diveiisificadon policy under a range of assumptions regarding labor supply.'"
In the absence of labor-supply response, a BMZ-style proposd clearly dominates the proposd for diversification. For the Weil case, the labor income tax rate under the BMZ-style proposal is nonstochasdc and the individud tax burden is perfecdy negadvely correlated with die wage. For die Mankiw case, dw BMZ-style proposal direcdy offsets idiosyncradc laborincome risk, though not the systematic risk in aggregate income. By contrast, the diversificadon proposd merely offisets an independent background risk.
This conclusion breaks down when laborsupply response is considered. As noted above, the existence of the Social Security obligadon implies that T > T, with probability I. The BMZ-style proposal involves a tax cut in period 1 and a tax increase in period 2, which exacerbates the intertempord labor-supply distortion." The welfare loss associated with this labor-supply distordon is first-order even when the change in tax rates is small. By contrast, diversification yields a positive expected retum to govemment (because of the equity premium) and therefore a reducdon in the expected period 2 tax rate E[71. '^ Hence, die welfare benefits of the BMZ-style proposd are considerably less '" We diank a referee for drawing our attention to the similarities and differences between diversification and the BMZ proposal.
'' The problem modeled in this paper is less favorable to a BMZ-style policy response because of die future liability. In die case considered by BMZ and Croushore, die status quo has t, = t^-" In die ahsence of market failure, this expected henefit would be fully of&et by die welfare cost of publicly bome risk. This is not the case here hecause of die idiosyncratic lahoiviacome risk home by individuals in the private sector. robust to labor-supply response than are those of diversification.
This argument applies to policies in which the only control variable is a proportional tax on labor income. If the government has access to a policy instrument permitting state-contingent lump-sum transfers, the first-best can always be obtained. In practice, as the difficulties encountered by proposals for poll taxes and negative income taxes have shown, no lump-sum instiuEient exists even if the instrument is not required to discriminate between individuals.
It may be useful to briefiy consider the more general case of an overlapping-generations model, in which aggregate lalxv and dividend income follow an eigodic path. To generate a large equity premium in models of this kind it is necessary to assume not only undiversifiable risk in labor income, but also borrowing constraints similar to those examined by Constantinides et al. (1998) . In this context, the risk reduction associated with govemment holdings of equity would be similar to that derived above, but the optimal policy would not, in general, require budget balance in eveiy period. Rather, the govemment would ptirsue a taxsmoothing policy subject to constraints on net debt. This observation reinforces the point that the risk-reduction benefits from diversification are independent of the particular tax policy used to achieve long-run budget balance. It is also important to note that a diversification policy is not vulnerable to Croushore's second criticism of BMZ: that, in a multiperiod model, it is not obvious how to identify the "current" period in which a deficit should be used to generate "future" risk reductions. 
